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Abstract
We consider a set-up in which there are multiple servers and multiple clients in a large distributed
computing system. Clients request servers to process jobs. Servers can only process one job in unit time.
There is no coordinating agent to route client requests to servers, and clients choose servers independently
and simultaneously, and only have access to the outcomes of their own past requests. If more than one
clients choose the same server, then only one randomly chosen client’s request will be fulfilled. If some
servers do not receive any request, they remain idle. In this paper, we show that a large category of
strategies are not effective in terms of server utilization. We devise strategies for clients that improve
server utilization of such systems over those of strategies known in the current literature.
Keywords: Client server; Server utilization; Strategies; Minority games; Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem.
1 Introduction
Consider a large distributed computing system that operates over a long time duration. The time duration
is modeled as a large number of successive short time slices. The system comprises a number of client
computers connected to a number of servers. In each time slice, a client computer can send a unit time
job request to a server. Each server is capable of executing exactly one request in each time slice. Hence
a server receiving only one request can fulfill the request, while a server requesting multiple requests can
fulfill one of the requests and deny the remaining. There is no coordinating agent, and at the beginning
of each time slice, the clients sending job requests each decide on the server to which to make its request
independently and simultaneously. In case no one makes a request to a server, that server is unutilized
during that time slice. Also if more than one clients send job requests to the same server, all but one will
be denied. In this paper, we consider a stylized version of this problem in which (a) the number of clients
equal the number of servers and (b) each client sends a job request to a server in each time slice, and devise
strategies to minimize the number of denied requests at any time slice after a sufficient number of time
slices have elapsed.
This problem is a variant of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem (see, e.g., Chakrabarti et al. 2009,
Ghosh et al. 2010, Chakraborti et al. 2015). The restaurant problem is played between a set of N customers
and a set of N restaurants over a large number of time periods. In each time period, customers indepen-
dently and simultaneously choose to visit one among N restaurants. Each restaurant can serve only one
customer. If there are more than the one customers choosing a particular restaurant in a particular time pe-
riod, then the restaurant picks one of these customers at random and serves her, while the other customers
choosing that restaurant are not fed. The restaurants are ranked, implying that mere occupation will not
keep customers happy as they would try not only to get food, but get it in the best restaurant.
A related game theoretic formulation is known as the Minority Game problem, which also goes by the
name of El Farol Bar problem (see, e.g., Arthur 1994, Challet et al. 2004, Challet and Zhang 1997, Fogel et al.
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1999). That problem imagines a bar that can accommodate at most Nmax people. It is said to become
crowded if Nc (< Nmax) or more people visit the bar on any particular evening. There are Nmax people
who decide whether or not to visit the bar on a particular evening. If the bar is crowded, then staying at
home is preferable to visiting the bar. However, if the bar is not crowded, then going to the bar is better
than staying at home. The game is called a minority game since a player is better off being in the minority.
In our problem, we adopt the feature of the minority game that only a finite number of clients can be
served at one location, but the number of locations are exactly equal to the number of clients. Thus every
client’s objective is to figure out from its own personal history, how to avoid being in majority i.e., clashing
with other clients in one location. In the context of client-server mapping, we ignore the ranking scheme
of servers. In the literature, it is assumed that information regarding past choices and successful matches
of the population are available and clients make use of this information while deciding on the server to
choose. In our context, looking up such information at every time slice can be prohibitively expensive,
especially since the time slices are short, and hence we restrict the information available to each client to its
own history only. Our goal is to maximize the number of fulfilled requests (i.e., the utilization of servers)
with simple strategies under this restricted information set.
As a benchmark, it may be noted that if each client chooses each location with identical probability,
then the utilization fraction is about 63% (Chakrabarti et al. 2009, see also Sec. 3) and the maximum uti-
lization rate achieved through rule-of-thumb probabilistic strategies reported in the literature is about 80%
(Ghosh et al. 2010). Most of the strategies considered in the literature often gave rise to significantly smaller
utilization rates.
In this work we provide a number of analytical and numerical results. The first set of results that
we state comprises essentially an irrelevance result. We show that the strategies of duplication of other
clients’ probabilistic strategies or any linear mixing of such strategies across clients (without accounting for
information regarding successful matches, either of one’s own or of others) lead to a steady state utilization
of 63%, the same as when each client chooses each location with identical probability. This result covers a
large set of possible strategies.
Then we move on to strategies with client-specific history dependence and show that significant im-
provements in average server utilization are possible using such strategies. We introduce reinforcement
learning through a set of strategies, which are differentiated according to the pool of clients who update
their respective strategies and the quantum of the update. In all the strategies, clients whose requests are
fulfilled at a time slice increase the probability that they assign to sending requests to the same server in
future time slices. A subset of the strategies do not concern themselves with situations in which client re-
quests are denied. Limiting cases in this subset range from ones in which no client updates its probabilities
to strategies in which a successful client sticks to the server that fulfilled its request for all future time slices.
This set of strategies is a generalization of the Polya urn scheme (Sornette 2004). Other strategies in the set
update probabilities for clients whose requests are denied.
The strategies in the set outperform strategies previously considered in the literature. The intuition is
the following. The clients objective is to always stay in minority, i.e., to avoid congestion. Under strategies
with reinforcement, a successful match increases probability that the successful client will request the same
server again and simultaneously the unsuccessful clients reduce their probability of requesting that server.
Such an outcome creates an endogenous dispersion of clients over time across servers reducing possible
congestion.
Finally, we study the fitness of these strategies in presence of purely randomizing clients who act as
noise traders. The overall utilization fraction decreases unsurprisingly due to their presence. However, it
is seen through simulation that, in a relative sense, the clients employing the above strategies outperform
noise traders.
This problem can be potentially extended to study the situation where the number of clients is not
the same as the number of servers. We primarily stick to a symmetric scenario since in this case, any
congestion would automatically imply a simultaneous existence of unused facility, i.e. unused servers as
well as unsuccessful clients. If we allow the numbers to differ from each other, then congestion or lack of
usage can arise because of mechanical constraints rather than a coordination failure.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we state the problem and provide the Pareto and
Nash solutions. In Sec. 3, we provide show that large set of probabilistic rules under linear mixing, would
converge to uniformly random distribution and hence cannot be used to increase utilization. In Sec. 4,
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we show that some simple rules with updating schemes based on past history significantly improves the
utilization ratio. Finally, we introduce heterogeneity in client population i.e. cases where more than one
population of clients compete who are following different sets of strategies. We conclude with a summary
and discussion.
2 Pareto efficiency and Nash equilibrium
In this section, we first provide a formal description of the game. Then we describe the Nash equilibrium
and the Pareto efficient allocation of this game. Finally, we motivate two classes of naı¨ve learning strategies.
2.1 Description of the game
The problem that we describe in the introductory section is essentially a game theoretic problem with the
following basic structure.
1. Time is discrete.
2. There are N clients and N servers. The set of clients is denoted by C and the set of servers by R.
3. At every time slice t, each client i sends exactly one connection request to one server.
4. Each server can accommodate at most one client in each time slice. If more than one clients send
requests to the server in the same time slice, then one of them is randomly chosen for that time slice.
5. Payoff of the i-th client in time slice t (piit) is 1 if its request is fulfilled in that time slice, and 0 otherwise.
6. The objective of each client is to secure a match with one server (i.e., maximize piit) at every time slice.
In the next part of this section, we describe the game theoretic and the most efficient solutions to this
problem and show that they are identical (Chakrabarti et al. 2009). The Nash equilibrium describes the
equilibrium configuration and not the process through which such a configuration might be achieved. It is
clear from the nature of the Nash equilibrium solution that attaining the Nash equilibrium requires tremen-
dous level of coordination among clients. It is unrealistic to assume such a level of coordination is attainable
among a large number of competing clients acting independently with only personal information. So in the
later portion of the paper, we devise some general rules-of-thumb that are easy to implement and produce
some reasonably close results, even though they may not lead to the first best outcome.
2.2 Pareto efficient allocation and Nash equilibrium
First, let us define Pareto efficiency and Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 (Allocation) An ‘allocation’ at time slice t At = {ait}i∈C , where ai denotes the server to which
client i sends a connection request at time slice t. Clearly ait ∈ R.
Definition 2.2 (Strategy) The ‘strategy’ of client i at time slice t is sit = {pijt}j∈R, where pijt is the probability
with which client i sends a connection request to server j at time slice t. Clearly,
∑N
j=1 pijt = 1. The strategies of all
clients except client i is denoted by s−it. The set of all strategies is denoted by S.
Definition 2.3 (Pareto efficiency, PE) A ‘Pareto efficient’ allocation of clients to servers is defined as an allocation
for which if one client is reassigned to improve its payoff, then the payoff of at least another client worsens.
Definition 2.4 (Nash equilibrium, NE) A ‘Nash equilibrium’ is defined as a strategy combination {s∗it}i∈C such
that for each client i pii(s
∗
it) ≥ pii(sit, s
∗
−it) for all sit ∈ S.
Clients compete against each other at every time slice. So we can describe the interactions between
clients at each time slice as a static one-shot game, which we call a server choice game. For such a game,
Chakrabarti et al. (2009) and Banerjee et al. (2012) show that the set of Pareto efficient outcomes is identical
to the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria through the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.5 Consider a server choice game. Then, allocation A = {ai}i∈C such that ai 6= aj for i 6= j,
i ∈ C, j ∈ R is PE, and strategy set comprising si = {pij}j∈R where pij = 1 if j = ai and 0 otherwise for all i ∈ C
is NE.
Proof: (see Chakrabarti et al. 2009, Banerjee et al. 2012). 
Proposition 2.5 characterizes the equilibrium configuration, but it does not specify how clients might ac-
tually play the game to achieve the PE allocation. We show below that with some naı¨ve learning strategies,
we can increase the utilization fraction significantly close to the Pareto allocation.
We consider two types of naı¨ve learning in the next two sections of this paper. In the first type we
consider an observation based learning process following DeGroot (1974). Here, the client strategies are
updated based on information about other clients’ strategies and not on actual information about past
successes and failures. At every time slice, a subset M ⊂ C of clients is chosen, whose strategies are
smt = {pmjt}j∈R form ∈M . They update their strategies following the protocol: for αi ∈ [0, 1],
pmj(t+1) =
∑
i
αipijt, for each j ∈ R.
Such a scheme allows copying as well as any arbitrary averaging strategies. We show in Sec. 3 that under
some general conditions, such strategies lead to a scenario where every client assigns equal probability to
all servers in the steady state.
The second type of naı¨ve learning considers updating strategies based on individual successes and fail-
ures, i.e. clients update their probability of sending a connection request to a server depending on whether
their requests were fulfilled or denied in the previous time slice. This type of learning also allows us to con-
sider situations in which the servers do not differentiate between clients, but the clients believe that there is
differentiation, and act accordingly. We consider examples of these strategies in details in Sec. 4 and show
that the average server utilization increases substantially under this type of naı¨ve learning.
3 Probability mixing
In this section we explore naı¨ve learning in which clients update their probabilities by combining their
strategies with those of other clients. We show that such mixing does not improve server utilization over
scenarios in which clients choose servers at random. We also show that under a general class of observa-
tional learning, the clients converge to the samemixed strategywith uniform probability distribution across
servers even though they start with arbitrary strategies.
Before analyzing such learning mechanisms, we describe one important result regarding server utiliza-
tion fraction (i.e., the fraction of the total number of servers that process requests during a time slice; seeNo
learning strategy in Chakrabarti et al. (2009) for a detailed exposition and discussion).
Proposition 3.1 (Chakrabarti et al. (2009)) If all clients assign equal probabilities to all servers, the utilization
fraction would be 1-exp(-1).
Proof: We state a general proof here which will be useful later. Suppose there areN servers and λN clients.
Each client assigns 1/N probability to each server. Therefore, the probability that a server is chosen by x
clients is given by the binomial distribution
Px =
(
λN
x
)(
1
N
)x(
1−
1
N
)λN−x
.
In the limit, the above expression can be approximated by a Poisson distribution,
lim
N→∞
Px =
λx
x!
exp(−λ)
So the probability that no client chooses one server is P0 = exp(−λ) which is exp(−1)when λ = 1. This im-
plies that the probability that a server will receive at least one request is 1−exp(−1). Note that, numerically
1− exp(−1) ≈ 0.632. 
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3.1 An irrelevance proposition
We now provide an analytical argument to explain the finding that under a large set of conditions, the
average utilization rate is 1−exp(−1). Belowwe define two parts of the game and show that if any strategy
satisfies the conditions described below, then it will admit a fixed point and we can characterize the fixed
point under certain conditions.
Suppose that the i-th client’s strategy is represented by a row vector si(t) = {pijt}j∈R. The column
vector S = {s1|s2| . . . |sN}
T represents the strategies of all clients. We can model the new strategy vector of
any client as the combination of two transformations, a linear transformation and a normalization.
Stage 1: Linear transformation
In the first stage, the client chooses to combine any probability assigned by any client to any server. In ma-
trix notation, let us define two column vectors collecting all probability values pt = {p11t, p12t, . . . , p1Nt, p21t,
p22t, . . . , pN1t, pN2t, . . . , pNNt}
T and qt = {q11t, q12t, . . . , q1Nt, q21t, q22t, . . . , qN1t, qN2t, . . . , qNNt}
T which we
normalize in stage 2. Let us also define a weight matrixW with non-negative entries. The linear transfor-
mation step of the strategy mixing process computes qt as
qt = W · pt.
Thus, for a generic (i, j) pair,
qijt =
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
wijklpklt. (1)
Note that here we do not impose any averaging condition i.e., row sums are not necessarily equal to 1.
We will impose such a condition in the next stage.
Stage 2: Normalization
Since
∑N
j=1 qijt 6= 1 at time slice t, for any i ∈ N in general, qijt values cannot be treated as probabilities.
So we normalize them as follows. We define a diagonal matrix Qit = (1/
∑N
j=0 qijt)I where I is an identity
matrix of size N . Then the components of the vector Qit · qit can be treated as probabilities. Using this
notation, we can write
p(t+1) = Qt · qt,
where Qt is a block diagonal matrix whose i-th diagonal component is the matrix Qit, and pij(t+1) in terms
of pijt values as
pij(t+1) =
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
klpklt∑N
j=1
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
klpklt
. (2)
3.2 Existence of a fixed point
Let us now restrict the discussion in the previous section to a strategy vector for all clients. The strategy
vector belongs to a simplex
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
pij = N.
Therefore, defining
∆N
2
= {p ∈ RN
2
∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
pij = N}.
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the whole updating scheme can be written as a mapping
f : ∆N
2
→ ∆N
2
Note that f is continuous in p, and that ∆N
2
is a convex and compact subset of the Euclidean space. To
prove existence of a fixed point of the mapping, we use the following theorem (see, e.g. Carter 2001).
Theorem 3.2 (Brower’s fixed point theorem) Every continuous function from a convex compact subset of a Eu-
clidean space to itself has a fixed point.
Proposition 3.3 A necessary condition for assigning uniform probability to each server by each clients is that
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
wijkl is a constant.
Proof: Suppose pijt = 1/N . Then from Eqn. 2,
pij(t+1) =
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
klpklt∑N
j=1
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
klpklt
=
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
kl∑N
j=1
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
kl
which is guaranteed to be 1/N only if
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
kl is a constant. 
3.3 Convergence to uniform probability
Let us now study convergence to uniform probability distribution. For this purpose, we assume the exis-
tence of mechanisms such that
N∑
j=1
qijt = 1 for all i ∈ C. (3)
Prop. 3.4 describes a necessary condition for the existence of such a strategy.
Proposition 3.4 A condition necessary to treat the column vector q as the updated strategy vector p(t+1) is
 N∑
j=1
wij11

 p11t +

 N∑
j=1
wij12

 p12t + . . .+

 N∑
j=1
wijNN

 pNNt = 1, (4)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof: Eqn. 3 can be rewritten as
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
wijklpklt = 1, (5)
which in turn can be expressed as Eqn. 4 using Eqn. 1. 
Corollary 3.5 A necessary condition for uniform probability is

 N∑
j=1
wij11

+

 N∑
j=1
wij12

+ . . .+

 N∑
j=1
wijNN

 = N, (6)
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Proof: Follows directly from Eqn. 4 by substituting pklt = 1/N for all k, l ∈ N and t. 
Under conditions satisfying Prop. 3.4, the second part of the transformation i.e. normalization, is redun-
dant and
p(t+ 1) = W · p(t). (7)
We now describe conditions under which Eqn. 4 describes a strategy evolution process by characterizing
two steps. In the first step, we show the convergence result for Eqn. 7 for generic matrixW . In the second
step, we provide conditions for all clients assign uniform probability to all servers. The first step relies on
Markov chain theory and the second step relies on consensus formation in DeGroot model (Jackson 2010).
We work under the following assumption.
Assumption 3.6 The row sum of the weight matrix is 1 i.e. for each client i, each server j,
∑N
k=1
∑N
l=1 w
ij
kl = 1.
We will use the following definitions related to matrices.
Definition 3.7 (Strongly connected matrix) An N ×N square matrixW is ‘strongly connected’ if for each pair
(i, j) ∈ N × N there exists a sequence of distinct indices i = r0, r1, . . . , rn = j such that wrkr(k+1) > 0 for
k = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Definition 3.8 (Directed cycle and cycle length) Consider anN×N square matrixW and a sequence of distinct
indices i = r0, r1, . . . , rn in W such that wrkr(k+1) > 0 for k = 0, . . . , n − 1 and wrnr0 > 0. Such a sequence is
called a ‘directed cycle’ of ‘length’ n.
Definition 3.9 (Aperiodic matrix) An N ×N square matrix A is ‘aperiodic’ if the lengths of all its directed cycles
are co-primes.
Prop. 3.10 below shows that convergence occurs.
Proposition 3.10 The strategy vector P converges if and only if every set of indices inW that is strongly connected
and closed is aperiodic.
Proof: This is a standard result based on Markov chains (see, e.g., Jackson 2010). 
Next, we show that each of the clients assign uniform probability.
Proposition 3.11 (Jackson (2010)) Under the updating matrix W , any strongly connected and closed group of
individuals assigns probabilities 1/N for every initial strategies if and only if it is aperiodic.
Proof: This proposition depends on two statements. Proposition 8.3.1 in Jackson (2010) provides the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for convergence to consensus where every client assigns same probability.
Since for each client, the probabilities must sum up to one, each probability must be 1/N .
Therefore, all clients will assign uniform probability to all servers, i.e., pijt|t→∞ =
1
N
. 
4 Updating strategies
We have so far considered cases in which agents do not “learn” from previous successes or failures when
updating their strategies but modify their strategies by observing those of other clients. We have seen that
for a large class of such strategies, only about 63.2% of the servers fulfil requests at each time slice in the
steady state when the number of servers is large (see Sec. 3). The present section is therefore devoted
to strategies based on a client’s own past performance in order to increase the utilization fraction of the
client server system. Under these strategies, clients do not use any information about other clients’ per-
formances or about past server utilization while updating strategies. They only retain their own history of
successes/failures and attempts.
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As before, we use the utilization fraction of servers, defined as the fraction of the total number of servers
that fulfil client requests during that time slice tomeasure the performance of a strategy. We also use another
measure called the stability fraction. It is the fraction of clients that assign a high enough probability for
selecting one particular server. We used a probability threshold value of 0.99.
For each of the strategies described in this section, every client starts by assigning equal probability 1/N
of sending connection requests to each server.
4.1 Updating by successful clients only
Consider the following update strategy. Suppose a client i sent a request to server r in time slice t. If its
request was fulfilled by the server, then it will opt for that particular server in all future time slices. If
however, the request was denied by the server, then in time slice t + 1, then client i does not update its
probability distribution when selecting servers in time slice t+ 1.
In other words, if client i’s request has been fulfilled by server r in time slice t, then for all time slices
τ > t
pijτ =
{
1 if j = r;
0 otherwise.
(8)
On the other hand if the request was denied, then
pij(t+1) = pijt for all j ∈ R.
We refer to this client probability updating strategy as STRATEGY 1.
We see from (8) that any client whose request has been served at any point becomes a stable client, so
that the stability fraction will increase to a value of 1 as the number of time slices increase. The utilization
fraction also increases and stabilizes at a value close to 0.8. It does not reach a value of 1 since more than
one clients can become stable after their requests are fulfilled by the same server in different time slices.
Proposition 4.1 If the clients follow STRATEGY 1 then the stability fraction tends to 1 and utilization fraction is
in the interval [0.79, 0.81].
Proof : We can show it by using Prop. 3.1. See App. 7 for a detailed proof. 
Figure 1 shows the variation in utilization fraction and stability fraction for a set of 1000 clients following
STRATEGY 1 requesting 1000 servers over 10 time slices. Note that the utilization fraction plotted for a time
slice is computed during each time slice, while the stability fraction plotted for a time slice is computed
after requests have been processed during that time slice. From this experiment we see that the utilization
fraction is approximately 0.8, which is within the range stated in Prop. 4.1.
4.2 Updating by all clients
Starting with client probability distributions identical to those at the start of STRATEGY 1, we now present
strategies that result in utilization fractions higher than those from STRATEGY 1 in the long term, i.e., after
a large number of time slices. In these strategies, called STRATEGY 2A and STRATEGY 2B, clients whose
requests have been denied during a time slice also update their probability distributions in the next time
slice.
STRATEGY 2A: Consider a client i that has sent a request to server r in time slice t. If the request was
fulfilled, then i increases the probability of requesting r in time slice t + 1 by a constant amount s or to
1 if that is not possible. This increase is compensated by a proportional decrease in the probabilities of
requesting other servers. This means that if pirt < 1 then
pij(t+1) =
{
pijt + δ if j = r;
(1 − α)pijt otherwise;
(9)
where δ = min{s, 1− pirt} and α = δ/(1− pirt). If pirt = 1, then pij(t+1) = pijt for all j ∈ R.
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Figure 1: Variation of utilization fraction and stability fraction for the set of clients following a non-
stochastic updating strategy
If the client’s request has been denied in time slice t, then it reduces the probability of requesting server
r in time slice t + 1 by a constant amount s or to 0 if that is not possible. In case pirt < 1, this decrease is
compensated by a proportional increase in the probabilities of requesting other servers. Thus
pim(t+1) =
{
pimt − θ ifm = r;
(1 + β)pimt otherwise;
(10)
where θ = min{s, pirt} and β = θ/(1− pirt).
If pirt = 1 in time slice t, then such a proportionate increase is not possible. In this situation the increase
is equal for all servers, i.e.,
pim(t+1) =
{
pimt − θ ifm = r;
θ/(N − 1) otherwise.
(11)
STRATEGY 2B: This strategy is a variation of STRATEGY 2A. In STRATEGY 2A, if client i sends a request
to server r in time slice t, the value of pir(t+1) usually differs from the pirt value by a constant amount if not
naturally truncated. In STRATEGY 2B, if client i’s request in time slice t has been fulfilled by server r, then
pirt increases by a constant fraction f of the amount (1− pirt). On the other hand if the request was denied
in time slice t, then pirt reduces by the same fraction f of the pirt value. Hence for this strategy, the form of
the expressions (9) through (11) remain unchanged, but the values of δ and θ change to
δ = f(1− pirt) and
θ = f pirt.
Notice that following this strategy, the probability that a particular client requests a particular server at any
time slice will never be either 0 or 1 if it was initially not set to either 0 or 1 (unless of course, f = 1).
Figure 2 shows the variation in utilization fraction and stability fraction with time slices if customers
follow STRATEGY 2A. The value of N is taken as 1000 and the step size s is varied from 0.001 to 0.1 in the
plots. Figure 3 shows the variation in utilization fraction and stability fraction with time slices if customers
follow STRATEGY 2B. The value of N is taken as 1000 and the fraction f is varied from 0.001 to 0.1 in the
plots.
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Figure 2: Variation of utilization and stability fractions with rounds when customers follow STRATEGY 2A
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Figure 3: Variation of utilization and stability fractions with rounds when customers follow STRATEGY 2B
4.3 Updating based on perceived history dependence
Next we consider a client strategy in which clients choose to connect to servers that have fulfilled their
requests in previous time slices. Hence clients behave as if servers that have favored them in the past
actually preferred to serve them over other clients. We refer to this strategy as STRATEGY POLYA. Servers
with multiple request of course choose clients at random, hence this is just a “perceived” dependence on
historical fulfillment of requests from the clients’ perspective.
This strategy is in line with the Polya’s urn model (Sornette 2004) that allows us to introduce reinforce-
ment learning for server choice. The essential idea is that if one request is fulfilled, then the client reinforces
choice of the same in the updated version. In one limit, no updating occurs. In the other end, extreme
updating occurs where a client assigns the full probability to one server that served the client just once.
Note that this allows us to interpolate between completely random strategies and STRATEGY 1.
Consider N clients and N servers. Clients update strategies as follows. Prior to the first round every
client allots a value of 1 to each server. Then it normalizes the values to obtain a probability 1/N of choosing
each of the N servers. If a client now sends a request to server r in the first time slice and this request is
fulfilled, she increases the value assigned to that server by an amount k = mN/(N − m) where m is a
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multiplier that is input to the process. When N is large, m = 1 will mean that the value assigned to the
server r is increased by approximately 1, leading to a very small increase in the preference for the server
r, while a value of m close to N implies that server r would definitely be chosen by client i in future time
slices.
Therefore at the end of time slice t, if the number of times client i’s connection request has been fulfilled
by the j-th server nijt times, then the probability of client i choosing server j in time slice (t+ 1) is
pij(t+1) =
1 + k nijt
N + k
∑N
l=1 nilt
. (12)
Note that the effect of these modifications on weights diminish as the number of time slices increase.
Hence the utilization fraction will stabilise asymptotically if clients follow this strategy. Also, when N
becomes large, the changes in probabilities will be small for small values ofm, and the strategy will be very
similar to the one in which a customer chooses a restaurant at random with equal probabilities.
We observed the values of the utilization fractions at the end of 10000 time slices when 1000 clients
following STRATEGY POLYA sent requests to 1000 servers over 10000 time slices, and the value of the
multiplierm was varied from 1 through 1000. The result is shown in Figure 4.
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
Ut
iliz
at
io
n 
fra
ct
io
n
multiplier (m)
Figure 4: Variation in the utilization fraction with increasing values of the multiplier m
These results have interesting connections with other strategies. Whenm = 0, k becomes 0 and the pijt
values all remain 1/N , i.e., there is no updating. This is identical to the situation described in Prop. 3.1
and the utilization fraction is approximately 0.632. Whenm = 1, k is approximately 1 for large N and this
corresponds to Polya’s urn model (see e.g., Sornette 2004). Whenm is sufficiently large, k tends to∞; hence
STRATEGY POLYA converges to STRATEGY 1 and we see the utilization fraction is approximately 0.8.
5 Heterogeneity in client strategies
In this section we combine a set of clients following one of the strategies presented in Section 4 with a set of
clients who choose servers at random. We examine the effect of this mixing on the overall utilization fraction
of all clients, and that of the set of clients following a strategy from Section 4, and show that clients who
update strategies based on their own past successes are better off than the rest even in mixed populations.
Consider the set S of clients partitioned into two sets Ss and Sr. Clients in Ss update probabilities of
choosing servers to make requests using one of the strategies described in Section 4, while clients in Sr
choose servers to make requests at random, i.e., they do not update their probabilities of choosing servers.
If clients in Ss follow STRATEGY 1, the utilization fractions of clients in Ss and Sr converge to their
stable values within the first few iterations. Hence in this case we only look at the stable values of the
utilization fractions. Figure 5 shows the variation in these utilization fractions of the set of all clients and
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of clients in Ss when clients in Ss update probabilities using STRATEGY 1 and (|Ss|, |Sr|) varies from (10,
990) to (990, 10). The plot on the left hand side of Figure 6 shows the variation in utilization fractions of
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Figure 5: Effect of mixing clients following STRATEGY 1 with clients choosing servers at random on uti-
lization fraction (total number of clients = 1000)
all clients and clients in Ss when the mix of clients is kept constant at (|Ss|, |Sr|) = (750, 250), clients in Ss
follow STRATEGY 2A, and the value of s is varied between 0.001 and 0.01. The plot on the right hand side
shows this variationwhen the value of s is kept constant at 0.01 and the mix (|S−s|, |Sr|) changes from (900,
100) to (100, 900). Figure 7 presents results from similar experiments when clients in Ss follow STRATEGY
2B. If clients in S − s follow STRATEGY POLYA, the utilization fractions of clients in Ss and Sr stabilize in
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Figure 6: Effect of mixing clients following STRATEGY 2A with clients choosing servers at random on uti-
lization fraction (total number of clients = 1000)
the first few time slices. (This is similar to the situation when they follow STRATEGY 1.) Figure 8 shows
the variation in the stabilized utilization fractions of the set of all clients and of clients in Ss when clients in
Ss update probabilities using STRATEGY POLYA and (|Ss|, |Sr|) varies from (10, 990) to (990, 10).
The results frommixing a set of clients that follow an updating strategy from Section 4 with clients who
do not update their probabilities follow a couple of common trends. First, the average utilization fractions
of the whole set of clients decrease as the proportion of clients that do not update probabilities increase in
12
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Figure 7: Effect of mixing clients following STRATEGY 2B with clients choosing servers at random on uti-
lization fraction (total number of clients = 1000)
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
Ut
iliz
at
io
n 
fra
ct
io
n
number of clients choosing at random
overall (m = 100)
STRATEGY POLYA (m = 100)
overall (m = 700)
STRATEGY POLYA (m = 700)
Figure 8: Effect of mixing clients following STRATEGY POLYA with clients choosing servers at random on
utilization fraction (total number of clients = 1000)
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the population of clients. This decrease is steepest when the average utilization fractions increase the most
as a result of clients following a particular strategy with a particular set of parameters. Second, in all the
mixes considered, the average utilization values of the set of clients that update probabilities is higher than
that of the whole population of clients. Hence it makes sense for a client to adopt an updating strategy even
if other clients in the population do not do so.
6 Summary
In this paper, we have considered a distributed computing system in which there are N servers and N
clients interacting over multiple time slices. The clients make job requests to servers at every time slice. The
servers can fulfil only one request in a time slice, and so if more than one clients request the same server, all
but one randomly chosen client’s request are denied. There is no coordinating agent and the clients decide
on which server to send job requests simultaneously and independently. We have modeled this as a game
in which there are N servers and N clients, in which a server remaining unutilized in a time slice implies
that a client request is denied in that time slice at some other server. This game essentially captures the idea
of coordination failures in a multi-agent environment. In this regard, it draws parallels with the Kolkata
Paise Restaurant problem and minority games. (See Sec. 1 for details.)
This paper makes two contributions. One, it provides a set of sufficient conditions such that if some
updating strategies satisfy them, the game would converge to one in which players make their choices at
random. Hence, it works as an irrelevance result stating that considering any such strategies is effectively
useless. (See Sec. 3 for these results.) Secondly and more importantly, we propose strategies that use only
clients’ own personal information and performs much better than the previously proposed strategies e.g.,
in Chakraborti et al. (2015) in terms of increasing utilization fraction. (See Sec. 4 for these strategies.)
We introduce the idea of reinforcement learning through a generalized scheme of Polya’s urn model.
It has two limits. The first limit is a random choice scheme which indicates zero reinforcement producing
about 63% utilization fraction. In the other end with extreme reinforcement, we show the the utilization
fraction is approximately 80%. (These results also appear in Sec. 4.)
Further experimentswith heterogeneous client population shows that although presence of noise traders
in the form of clients who make choices purely at random reduce the overall server utilization, clients
with the suggested strategies outperform them. Thus employing such strategies are better even with noise
traders. (See the discussion in Sec. 5.)
The work reported here can be useful for maximizing global efficiency of massive systems with parts
operating in parallel, that need to secure connections between complementary parts repeatedly. Rather than
using protocols that require collection of information across the system, such simple modes of distributed
computation increase system efficiency at low implementation costs.
Acknowledgement: The first author is grateful to Bikas K. Chakrabarti for some useful discussions.
7 Appendix
Proof of Prop. 4.1 : Recall from Prop. 3.1 that withN servers and λN clients, the fraction of utilized servers
would be
f = 1− exp(−λ).
Let us consider this case time slice by time slice. See Fig. 1 for comparing the values of the utilization
fraction and the stability fraction we derive in the following with the simulation results.
t= 1 : In the first time slice, there are N clients and N servers, with each client assigning 1/N probability to
each server. Therefore, by applying Eqn. 7 from Prop. 3.1 that the first time slice’s utilization fraction
is approximately
f1 ≈ 0.632.
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Following the same calculations, the stabilization fraction in the first time slice is
θ1 ≈ 0.632.
t= 2 : In the next time slice, f1 fraction of clients have stabilized following their strategy protocol. Around
0.368 fraction could not secure a server and hence, have not stabilized either. In this time slice, they
will choose randomly. So (1− f1)N number of clients would choose randomly fromN servers. Again
by applying Eqn. 7 , we see that the new fraction of potentially successful matches would be
fpot2 ≈ 1− exp(−0.368)
≈ 0.307.
However, there will be out of these many new potential matches, there will be crowding in the servers
already chosen by those already stabilized in the first time slice. Therefore,
f2 ≈ 0.632 + 0.368× 0.307
≈ 0.744.
Computing the stabilization fraction is a bit more involved. Out of the new 0.307 fraction, 0.632 ×
0.307 fraction do crowd into servers that were utilized in the first time slice. Since the servers do not
differentiate across clients, the fraction of stabilized clients (old clients+new clients conflicting with
old clients + new clients in new locations) would be
θ2 ≈ 0.632 + (0.632× 0.307)/2 + 0.368× 0.307
≈ 0.842.
t= 3 : Thus the fraction of unstabilized clients are now 1− θ2 = 0.158. Therefore, following same logic,
f3 ≈ 0.744 + (1− exp(−0.158))× (1 − 0.744)
≈ 0.781.
To compute the stabilization fraction, let us ignore the possibility that there might be more than 2
clients at one server, for the sake of tractability. Therefore, the new fraction of stabilized clients (old
clients+new clients conflicting with old clients + new clients in new locations) would be
θ3 ≈ 0.842 + (0.744× (1 − exp(−0.158))/2 + (1− 0.744)× (1− exp(−0.158))
≈ 0.933.
One can go on computing in a similar fashion. For t = 4, θ4 would be approximately 0.98 and f4 would be
approximately 0.79.
As can be verified from Fig 1, by the fourth time slice about 98% of clients would have stabilized utilizing
more than 79% servers. Simulation shows that the subsequent gains in utilization fraction is very small as it
converges as the population stabilizes quite fast (see Fig. 1). Therefore the range of the limiting utilization
fraction has to be [0.79, 0.79+0.02] or [0.79, 0.81]. Numerically it is seen to converge to approximately 0.80.

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